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Abstract 
The study re-examines Chester Barnard’s contributions to knowledge management. 
Michael Polanyi’s concepts such as tacit knowing and personal knowledge give some 
researchers hints to develop knowledge management. The researchers utilize some 
concepts of behavioral knowledge such as skills and implicit knowledge that integrate 
action and knowledge. In contrast, Barnard argues that not only knowledge but also 
thinking are integrated in action; therefore, he contributes to expanding the scope of 
knowledge management. However, Barnard’s contributions are less appreciated than 
that of Polanyi, with several exceptions. It is assumed that one reason is the limited 
access to his works except for his seminal book, The Functions of the Executive. 
Therefore, first, the study reviews the literature describing Barnard’s views on 
experiential learning, intuitive, judgmental decision making, and organizational 
knowledge. Further, the study systematically examines how Barnard develops his 
theory on practical thinking and knowledge. Finally, it reevaluates his contributions to 
knowledge management. 
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Introduction 
This paper re-examines Chester Barnard’s contributions to knowledge management. 
Barnard argues that practitioners integrate action, knowledge and thinking and develop 
their own methods of thinking, and he contributes to expanding the scope of knowledge 
management. Therefore, Barnard can also be considered a pioneer of knowledge 
management. However, his contributions are less appreciated than those of Polanyi, 
with several exceptions.  
Michael Polanyi is regarded as one of the founders of knowledge management. 
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 During the 1980s, social scientists began to pay attention to Polanyi’s concepts of tacit 
knowing and personal knowledge to consider how to use behavioural knowledge in 
business. Nelson and Winter (1982) describe the skilled behaviour of individuals to 
explain organizational capabilities on the basis of tacit knowing. Schon (1983) 
emphasizes the importance of knowing-in-action and he regards Polanyi as a pioneer in 
building the concept of behavioural knowledge. Badaracco (1991) refers to Polanyi’s 
concept of personal knowledge, highlighting that sharing embedded knowledge 
encourages strategic alliances within a company. Nonaka and Takeuchi published The 
Knowledge Creating Company in 1995, developing their own concepts of explicit and 
implicit knowledge on the basis of Polanyi’s work. This book enjoyed widespread 
acceptance among the business community, triggering the flourishing of knowledge 
management. Subsequently, the Strategic Management Journal and California 
Management Review each published a special issue on knowledge management in 1996 
and 1998, respectively, which accelerated this research trend. Thus, I can say that 
Polanyi’s concepts are often employed to develop knowledge management. The 
researchers who contribute to developing knowledge management argue for the 
integration of action and knowledge and they propose new concepts of knowledge, such 
as skills, knowing-in-action, embedded knowledge and implicit knowledge. Major 
contributors to developing knowledge management such as Schon, Badaracco, Nonaka 
and Takeuchi also refer to Barnard’s views on organizational knowledge as they 
describe their ideas. However, Barnard’s contributions to knowledge management do 
not seem to be fully appreciated. 
Barnard’s ideas were published from the 1930s to the 1950s. Barnard develops his 
theory on practical thinking and knowledge to explain that practitioners use both 
behavioural and formal knowledge. In a period overlapping Barnard’s work, Polanyi 
developed his ideas from the 1940s to the 1960s. As Gelwick (1977) notes, Polanyi 
develops the concept of personal knowledge to explain the logic of scientific discovery. 
Polanyi (1946) originated the discussion on this specific topic, after which he was 
invited to deliver the Gifford Lecture series in 1951–1952 at the University of Aberdeen. 
He revised the drafts and partially published papers in the period 1952–1958. Finally, 
Polanyi established his theory by publishing Personal Knowledge (Polanyi, 1958a). He 
released The Study of Men as an introduction to Personal Knowledge at the same time 
(Polanyi, 1958b). To disseminate his ideas, Polanyi published The Tacit Dimension and 
Knowing and Being (Polanyi, 1966, 1969).  
Both Barnard and Polanyi built their ideas on behavioural knowledge in parallel in 
roughly the same period. I assume that one reason why Barnard’s contributions are not 
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 fully recognized is because of the limited access to his works except for his seminal 
book, The Functions of the Executive. Therefore, first, I specifically examine the 
literature on his contributions; second, I systematically demonstrate how Barnard 
develops his theory; finally, I re-evaluate Barnard’s contributions to knowledge 
management.  
 
Literature Review of Research on Barnard’s Contributions 
In this section, I review research describing Barnard’s contributions. I divide them into 
three groups categorized by their focus – experiential learning, intuitive, judgmental 
decision making and organizational knowledge – although some overlaps exist. 
Experiential Learning 
Schon (1983) emphasizes that our knowing is in our action and that the workday life of 
professionals depends on tacit knowing-in-action. Schon (1983) argues that in their 
daily practice, professionals make innumerable qualitative judgments for which they 
cannot state adequate criteria and that professionals display skills for which they cannot 
state the rules and procedures. Schon (1983) refers to pioneers who discuss 
knowing-in-action, such as Ryle (1949), Barnard (1938) and Polanyi (1966). Schon 
(1983) highlights the fact that Barnard (1936) distinguished thinking processes from 
non-logical processes that cannot be expressed in words or as reasoning and which are 
only expressed by a judgment, decision, or action. 
Schon (1983) notes that professional practice includes an element of repetition. A 
professional is considered a specialist who repeatedly encounters a certain type of 
situation, often called a case. Professionals become accustomed to these cases and their 
knowing-in-action tends to become increasingly tacit, spontaneous and automatic. 
Through this process, professionals develop their skills and knowledge as specialists. 
However, this type of knowing-in-action sometimes leads to the state of over-learning 
what they know. Thus, Schon (1983) argues that a professional’s abilities are based on 
knowing-in-action and describes how professionals learn and lose their flexibility to 
learn in organizations. 
Levitt and March (1990) consider Barnard’s primary concern to be the problem of 
organizing. Barnard distinguishes a conflict system from a cooperative system. The 
problem of organizing is how to transform a conflict system into a cooperative system. 
Levitt and March (1990) assert that most representative researchers in the field of 
organization follow this Barnard tradition. 
However, Levitt and March (1990) contend that the followers of the Barnard tradition 
ignore the relationship between reason and intelligence; specifically, the fact that 
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 Barnard does not equate the process of reason or rationality with intelligence does not 
receive sufficient attention. Barnard (1936) distinguishes between logical and 
non-logical mental processes and makes a case for the intelligence of the latter and the 
limitations of the former. Non-logical mental processes focus on good judgment or 
sense and relate to the coding of experience and knowledge. Levitt and March (1990) 
state that “Barnard is not an unconditional enthusiast for unreason, but a cautious 
observer of the lack of any perfect process for intelligence” (p. 14). To overcome the 
limitations of rationality, Barnard emphasizes that “learning is a route to intelligence 
that matches organizational capabilities better than rationality” (Levitt & March, 1990, 
p. 14). Barnard considers experiential learning and other forms of non-rational 
processes as essential though imperfect. Thus, Levitt and March (1990) build a theory 
of experiential learning on the basis of Barnard’s contributions. 
Isomura (2010) argues that Barnard emphasizes the importance of learning from 
experience. According to Barnard (1937, 1945a), business people face a complex and 
evolving reality that includes the unknown and unknowable. Therefore, the requisite 
abilities and qualities for leaders are not only intellectual but also non-intellectual. 
Formal education is useful for developing intellectual abilities but not for 
non-intellectual ones. 
Isomura (2010) evaluates Barnard’s contributions to informal learning (Barnard, 
1945a, 1945b) as follows. Although Barnard stresses the importance of experience, he 
indicates that experience is different from the repetition of action. Those who have the 
habit of action within their area of responsibility are deeply changed and differently 
orientated because of their experience. To behave adequately, professionals require an 
intimate, habitual, intuitive familiarity with things, systematic knowledge of things, and 
an effective way of thinking about things.  
Intuitive, Judgmental Decision Making 
On the basis of Barnard (1936), Simon (1987) asserts that executives depend on 
intuitive or judgmental responses to demanding decision-making situations rather than 
an orderly rational analysis. Simon (1987) insists that Barnard does not regard 
non-logical decision-making processes as magical in any sense, but rather that he 
considers non-logical processes as grounded in knowledge and experience. Simon 
demonstrates the role of intuitive, judgmental decision making in instant decisions by 
experts such as chess players or medical doctors. Through long experience, chess 
masters or medical doctors accumulate a set of patterns for what they should do in a 
given situation. Consequently, experts can make problem diagnoses and propose 
solutions rapidly and intuitively although they cannot report how they reached their 
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 conclusions. Experts build recognition and retrieval processes that use a large number of 
information chunks or patterns stored in long-term memory. Intuitive, judgmental 
decision making is possible on the basis of qualitative knowledge acquired and 
accumulated through experience. 
Simon (1986) also highlights the fact that Barnard (1938) posits that there are limits 
on attention when executives make decisions in everyday, ever-changing situations. 
Executives face such complicated situations that they focus on a strategic factor to 
reduce complexity. They identify a strategic factor through intuitive judgment. 
Experienced executives are familiar with situations that they often encounter and 
therefore they can rapidly distinguish which factor is crucial to change the situation.  
Wolf (1994) points out that Barnard gives particular attention to non-logical thought 
processes. According to Wolf (1994), Barnard regards non-logical thought processes as 
essential and in many cases dominant in executive decision making. Practitioners often 
make a decision instantly to handle a changing situation. Thus, Wolf (1994) states 
“Barnard observed that most people are not aware, in the abstract, of what they want; 
why they do what they do; or how they do it” (p. 1051). On this basis, Wolf argues that 
Barnard emphasizes the importance of non-intellectual as well as intellectual ability and 
that non-logical thought is not illogical but cannot be expressed in words or other 
symbols. 
Wolf published a special issue on Chester Barnard as a guest editor of the Journal of 
Management History in 1995, wherein Wolf (1995a) intended to describe Barnard’s 
contributions to decision processes, especially intuitive, judgmental decision making. 
This special issue includes Barnard’s classic article, “Mind in everyday affairs”, his 
unpublished book, The Significance of Decisive Behavior in Social Action, his 
correspondence with Herbert Simon and significant comments found in his personal 
papers. The literature published here is very useful in deepening understanding of 
Barnard’s insights on intuitive, judgmental decision making.  
Novicevic, Hench, and Wren (2002) have high praise for Barnard’s views on intuition 
and non-logical decision making. Barnard views intuition as “strings of tacit knowledge 
and organizational learning, system dynamics and the knowledge-based view of the firm, 
and problem-framing, pattern recognition, and emergent self-organization” (Novicevic, 
et al., 2002, p. 992).  
Novicevic et al. (2002) explain in detail Barnard’s conceptualization of organic, 
personal and formal forms of knowledge on the basis of Barnard (1940/1995). Intuition 
figures strongly in identifying strategic factors in a situation and developing organic 
knowledge through experience. Thus, Novicevic et al. (2002, p. 998) conclude that 
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 Barnard’s concept of intuition is “the invisible organic glue that bonds the various forms 
of knowledge together (i.e. thus integrating thought and action) in the knowledge 
discovery process” (i.e. thus facilitating innovation). 
Organizational Knowledge 
Badaracco (1991) argues that embedded knowledge figures strongly in building a 
strategic alliance. He distinguishes migratory knowledge from embedded knowledge. 
On the one hand, migratory knowledge is packaged, articulated, mobile knowledge that 
is capable of moving quickly. This type of knowledge can be packaged in a formula, a 
design, a manual or a book and can be contained in one’s person or incorporated in a 
piece of machinery. On the other hand, embedded knowledge resides primarily in a 
specialized relationship among individuals and groups, in particular the norms, attitudes, 
information flows and decision-making methods that shape their interactions. 
Badaracco (1991) highlights the importance of embedded knowledge because it creates 
long-term competitive advantage in a company.  
When Badaracco (1991) develops his ideas of embedded knowledge, he refers to 
Barnard (1938), Simon (1947), Arrow (1973), Williamson (1985), Polanyi (1958a), 
Nelson and Winter (1982) and Selznick (1957). He argues that Barnard considers the 
thinking process of an organization. Barnard regards the first executive function as 
developing and maintaining a system of communication. The communication system 
transmits not only hard data but also “intangible facts, opinions, suggestions, and 
suspicions” through what Barnard calls the “compatibility of personnel” (Barnard, 1938, 
pp. 224–225). “Organizations think and decide by processing—transmitting, altering, 
refining, elaborating, ignoring, and combining—both hard and soft information” 
(Badaracco, 1991, p. 89).  
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) note that “Barnard recognizes the importance of the 
integration of the logical and non-logical processes of human mental activity, of 
scientific and behavioral knowledge, and the managerial and moral functions of 
executives” (p. 37). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) summarize Barnard’s views on 
knowledge as follows:  
 
First, knowledge consists not only of logical, linguistic content but also of 
behavioral, non-linguistic content. Second, leaders create values, belief, and ideas 
to maintain the soundness of a knowledge system within the organization as well 
as to manage the organization as a cooperative system (pp. 36–37). 
 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) further assert that the essence of the problem of organizing, 
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 according to Barnard, is how to transform the actors who strategically pursue mutually 
conflicting goals into a rational cooperative system. Knowledge is essential in securing 
cooperative rationality because of our limited capability to process information. 
However, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) state that Barnard does not explain the 
organizational process of knowledge creation: how to convert an organizational 
member’s implicit, behavioural knowledge into organizational knowledge and how best 
to implement this knowledge in action upon the environment. Therefore, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) develop a theory of knowledge creation by building a conceptual 
framework to answer these questions. 
Gehani (2002) asserts the necessity of re-examining Barnard (1938) to develop a 
knowledge-based dynamic theory of the firm, which conceptualizes the enterprise as a 
body of tacit and explicit knowledge. Gehani (2002) suggests that Barnard’s view of the 
executive is deeply related to the creation and utilization of knowledge embedded in 
individuals and organizations. Barnard pioneers the vision that organizational learning 
occurs best with some form of collaboration between employees with embedded 
knowledge. In addition, Gehani (2002) notes that Barnard regards the role of the 
executive as being to create the context for the fulfilment of the firm’s purpose and its 
growth. 
Gehani (2002) argues that Barnard (1950) has a systematic view of the forms of skill, 
knowledge and judgment. Barnard provides prophetic advice to executives to build their 
emotional inter-personal skills, intuitiveness and the ability to judge and act on the basis 
of ambiguous or insufficient information (Gehani, 2002). Gehani (2002) insists that 
Barnard precedes many other modern researchers of knowledge management by several 
decades.  
Moreover, Gehani (2002) re-examines each of Barnard’s prophetic views on 
organization and management and explores how these concepts relate to the 
knowledge-based view of the firm: cooperation over control, open systems, a living and 
informal organization, decision making, a bottom-up view of authority, non-logical 
mental processes and executive responsibilities. Thus, Gehani (2002) regards Barnard as 
a pioneer of knowledge management. 
To sum up, researchers argue that Barnard’s contributions are to emphasize the 
importance of experience-based knowledge and thinking and suggest the possibility of 
utilizing this type of knowledge and thinking as intangible management resources 
accumulated in an organization. 
 
Barnard’s Theory of Practical Thinking and Knowledge 
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 In this section, I systematically demonstrate how Barnard developed his theory of 
practical thinking and knowledge. 
Non-Logical Mental Processes 
Barnard (1936) argued the importance of non-logical mental processes, proposing the 
following two different mental processes: logical and non-logical. He defined a logical 
process as “conscious thinking which could be expressed in words, or other symbols, 
that is, reasoning” (p. 302). Alternatively, he defined non-logical processes as “those not 
capable of being expressed in words or as reasoning, which are only made known by 
judgment, decision or action” (Barnard, 1936, p. 302). 
Barnard suggested that practitioners predominantly utilize the non-logical process in 
daily life although its importance is often neglected because of “the general belief that 
reasoning indicates a higher order of intellect than do the non-logical processes 
underlying quick judgments” (Barnard, 1936, p. 303).  
Barnard recognized the following three factors that affect the mental processes people 
use: the purposes of mental effort, speed and the nature of the materials to which the 
mind is applied.  
Purposes and speed 
When the purpose is to search for the truth, logical processes should be applied. 
However, determining a course of action or persuading someone requires non-logical 
processes. When the purpose is to ascertain or formulate a truth, ample time is available 
for the effort and thus haste is an unacceptable excuse for poor reasoning. However, in 
many circumstances, mental efforts must be concluded within too short a period to 
apply logical reasoning. Thus, in cases requiring immediate decision making for action, 
non-logical processes predominate. 
Materials  
Barnard divided the nature of material to which the mind is applied into the following 
three classes: precise information, hybrid material and speculation. 
The first type of material “consists of observation from which a conclusion may be 
drawn by scientific method, and propositions or facts previously established or widely 
accepted as true” (Barnard, 1936, pp. 309–310); therefore, formal logic can be applied. 
The second type “consists of data of poor quality or limited extent, propositions 
recognized as of doubtful validity or of tentative character, and qualitative facts which 
cannot be expressed numerically, requiring such adjectives as good or poor, bright or 
dim, orange or yellow, fine or coarse, stable or unstable, etc.” (Barnard, 1936, p. 310). 
Therefore, the logical inference process may be preserved but the premises become 
more ambiguous. A large part of the mental work in business and government certainly 
8
 addresses such material. The third type “consists of impressions and probabilities not 
susceptible of mathematical expression and purely contingent uncertainties, including 
the possibility or the probability of the existence of unknown factors and their possible 
effect” (Barnard, 1936, p. 310). In this case, subjective and non-logical processes 
produce a judgment. 
Thus, a logical process applies only to material consisting of precise information and 
therefore the applicable scope of scientific reasoning is narrow. In contrast, the 
applicable scope of a non-logical process is wider because business people deal with 
largely qualitative and ambiguous material. Barnard (1936) warned that the process is 
likely to be wrong if it is based on fallacious reasoning.  
Barnard (1937) refined his ideas of these different materials by discussing a stratified 
structure of reality. He argued that reality is composed of verbalized, consciously 
perceived and unconsciously sensed materials. In addition, Barnard (1945a, 1950) 
emphasized that business people encounter the unknown and unknowable and yet they 
cannot avoid making a decision. What is expressed in language is limited; practitioners 
extract only the smallest part of the full reality, collect its fragments to analyse their 
relationship and construct their understanding of the reality (Barnard, 1937).   
Fictions  
Barnard (1936) discussed how non-logical processes are based on fiction. Barnard 
defined a fiction as follows: 
 
A fiction, as the word is used here, is an assertion that a fundamental statement is 
true when it is recognized that its truth cannot be demonstrated either by theoretical 
reasoning or by experimental evidence. Fictions are called by the following 
different names: axioms, self-evident truths, postulates, sanctions, presumptions, 
assumptions, facts “as a matter of course,” etc. (Barnard, 1936, p. 314). 
 
The material that practitioners handle is largely qualitative, making it difficult to 
prove that certain fictions are true, although others are known not to be true. Thus, 
Barnard suggested that practitioners accept certain fictions as true despite the fact that 
their truthfulness is not scientifically verifiable. 
Reactions 
Barnard (1936) asserted that the most important difference between logical and 
non-logical processes is the presence or absence of a reaction by the subject on whom 
the processes are applied. On the one hand, “pure physical science has for its subject the 
ascertainment of truth about the physical universe but it has neither for its purpose nor 
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 its effect a change in that universe” (Barnard, 1936, p. 317). On the other hand, “the 
expression of opinion, the description of a condition, the writing of a law or the 
determination of an action in the world of men changes the world” (Barnard, 1936, p. 
317). Therefore, in reality, there is a constant readjustment of political, economic and 
social conditions to both actions and expressions of opinion. There are no identical 
situations in the world and what people say and do changes their world, requiring them 
continuously to adjust to their situations. A non-logical process is better suited than a 
logical one to this reality. 
Strategic Thinking and Decision Making 
Barnard (1936) called non-logical processes “intuition”, “good judgment”, “inspiration”, 
“stroke of genius”, “sense”, “good sense”, “common sense”, “judgment”, and “bright 
idea” (p. 305). Therefore, non-logical processes are considered to be deeply related to 
the practitioner’s way of thinking. Barnard (1945a, 1947a) posited that there are at least 
two distinct methods of thinking, linear and strategic, considered equivalent to the 
logical and the non-logical mental processes, respectively. 
Barnard (1945a, 1947a) noted that the method of thinking used depends on the 
situation. If the number of variables is limited and they are accurately measured, linear 
thinking is appropriate and clarifies the relationships among the variables. In contrast, if 
the number of variables is large and cannot be measured quantitatively, strategic 
thinking is more suitable. 
Strategic thinking is applied in situations consisting of many interdependent variables. 
Thus, “Strategic reasoning involves picking out a single factor and operating on it alone 
so that the effect may be said to be caused by the change in that factor” (Barnard, 1945a, 
p. 180). Barnard (1938) distinguished between the following two factors when making a 
decision: “those which if absent or changed would accomplish the desired purpose, 
provided the others remain unchanged; and these others” (p. 203). Barnard called the 
former a “limited” or “strategic” factor and the latter a “complementary” factor. 
Business people intuitively select one strategic factor to be changed and therefore 
strategic thinking is a matter of aesthetic and intuitive judgment. 
Why are practitioners able to choose strategic factors intuitively? Barnard (1945b, 
1947b) emphasized the importance of “intimate, habitual, intuitive familiarity with 
things” (Henderson, 1941–1942/1970, p. 67). Barnard shared Henderson’s view that 
understanding in the social field is impossible without experience. 
Business people try to change a strategic factor through their decision, resulting in a 
change of the very situation. In the course of their actions, the strategic and 
complementary factors continually change places. An initially strategic factor becomes 
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 complementary after it has been brought under control and another factor becomes 
strategic. As previously discussed, practitioners encounter situations in which their 
action causes a reaction from their environment; therefore, they must react to the 
changed environment. Consequently, Barnard (1938) asserted that “the process of 
decision is one of successive approximations—constant refinement of purpose, closer 
and closer discriminations of fact—in which the march of time is essential” (p. 206). 
Thus, the process integrates action and thinking. 
In his letter to Simon, Barnard considered whether the decision-making process is 
exploratory (Wolf, 1995b). Here, Barnard discussed important ideas regarding decision 
making. The decision-making process is exploratory and based on a trial-and-error 
method; the non-logical process is subjectively rationally based on a trial-and-error 
method. “Such decisions when deliberately exploratory are subjectively rational and I 
think in the aggregate are objectively rational in that only by experience and a 
continuous trial-and-error procedure is it possible to acquire the data for other rational 
decisions” (Wolf, 1995b, p. 96). Numerous such decisions occur in business. Thus, the 
non-logical process can be rational even though intuition is often regarded as irrational 
or undependable. 
Strategic reasoning differs from the analytical approach in that the decision process 
reflects the sense of things as a whole. Barnard (1938) emphasized the importance of 
the sense of the whole. Practitioners review their decision process by utilizing their 
sense of the whole and modify their judgments when they feel something is wrong 
(Barnard, 1938, p. 239). Barnard argued that alert executives continually raise questions 
for determination in their mind and decide not to decide on what is not pertinent at that 
moment (Barnard, 1938, p. 193). This way of thinking is close to what Martin (2007a, 
2007b) calls “integrative thinking”. 
Experience as a Learning Process 
Barnard (1936) emphasized that the non-logical process develops primarily through 
experience. He suggested that no direct method seems applicable for developing the 
efficiency of non-logical processes and that the mind is rather stocked through 
experience and study: “There seems to be no substitute for using the mind, applying it, 
working it, to develop its power” (Barnard, 1936, p. 321). Therefore, experience figures 
strongly in developing non-logical processes, but “study supplements that process by 
introducing facts, concepts, patterns that would fail of perception through undirected 
experience” (Barnard, 1936, p. 321). 
Moreover, Barnard (1936) asserted that the proper use of the mind requires a moral 
attitude, stating that “‘intellectual honesty’ too often means a puritanical and 
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 disinterested acceptance of conclusions under a mere code of reasoning” (p. 321). Thus, 
Barnard (1936, p. 322) identified the importance of balancing experience and study by 
proposing that “brains” without “minds” seems to constitute a futile imbalance. 
Barnard (1936) explained that experience means doing things, i.e. action, and taking 
responsibility. Barnard (1940/1995) defined experience as “the properties, 
characteristics and capacities that are impressed on the organism in the course of its life, 
by living and interacting with its environment” (p. 79) and further stated that to 
experience or to acquire experience is to learn. Thus, Barnard regarded experience as 
something people acquire through interaction with their environment. Business people 
improve their abilities through experience and therefore experience means a learning 
process. Barnard (1945b) shares this view with Henderson, who argues that “the man 
who has a habit of action under responsibility is deeply modified and differently 
oriented because of this experience” (1941–1942/1970, p. 66). 
Skills and Personal and Formal Knowledge 
Barnard (1940/1995, p. 79) observed that the organism acquires experience in two 
important modes, both with and without awareness or consciousness. He called what 
people acquire without consciousness of the experience “organic knowledge” 
(1940/1995, p. 79). He further explained that conscious experience is of the following 
two kinds: personal knowledge (awareness of what the individual is doing, perceiving 
and feeling) and formal knowledge (the receipt – comprehension of oral or written 
communication together with thought expressed verbally – of intellectual knowledge). 
Acquiring experience depends on the following three factors: “primary physiological 
capacities or characteristics; the occasions of experience; and the amount and character 
of previous experience” (Barnard, 1940/1995, p. 80). 
Barnard (1940/1995) presented the following 10 different forms of experience: (1) 
patterns of physiological reactions, (2) patterns of muscular behaviour, (3) emotional 
dispositions (affective states), (4) organic knowledge of the concrete, (5) an organic 
sense of analogy, (6) personal knowledge of fact, (7) formal knowledge of fact, (8) 
formal knowledge of concepts, (9) mental attitudes and (10) knowledge of intellectual 
procedures. Subsequently, Barnard (1950) organized and developed these ideas into 
skills and personal and formal knowledge. Consequently, on the basis of these three 
concepts, several proposals are made in relation to each aspect. 
Skills 
Barnard (1940/1995) suggested that physiological reactions to the external environment, 
such as muscular behaviour and emotional dispositions, are significantly modified by 
experience or conditioning, producing certain patterns of reaction. For example, 
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 encountering a dangerous situation produces the pattern of reaction called “fear”. Within 
this reaction, “The pattern often includes increased heart action and pulse rate, 
perspiration, tense muscular conditions, either immobility or rapid action, increased 
respiration and involuntary motions of various sorts” (Barnard, 1940/1995, p. 81). 
The patterns of muscular behaviour are often very complex and precise; they are 
“physical skills” acquired by repetition and often by artificial repetition known as 
practice. Physical skill is the ability of an individual to control and direct the 
movements of his or her body (Barnard, 1950). Moreover, physiological states, termed 
emotional, are physiological in the sense that they result from disturbances of 
equilibrium arising from pathological organic causes, such as those attributable to high 
or low blood pressure. Thus, the individual learns biological patterns to react to the 
environment and these patterns control their mental stability, behaviour and emotions. 
Therefore, Barnard (1940/1995) argued that these patterns are unconscious and always 
affect the intuitive process. 
Through these forms of experience, people “know how to act effectively in ways that 
take into account concrete objects, events, and movements that were never ‘observed’ in 
any ordinary meaning, that cannot be explained by the actor and that are not understood 
by him” (Barnard, 1940/1995, p. 83). Barnard considered that such behaviour 
constitutes evidence of organic knowledge. Organic knowledge is also called “practical” 
or “behavioural” knowledge (Barnard, 1938, p. 291). Organic knowledge is related to 
action; it accumulates in a person’s body and is unconsciously used when needed. 
Barnard (1940/1995) stated that “organic knowledge as a form of experience is so much 
‘matter of course’ knowledge that its prevalence and indispensable character have been 
egregiously neglected” (p. 84). 
This type of knowledge is important because decision making in many situations 
depends on the intuitive ability based on organic knowledge. Barnard (1940/1995) 
posited that “with the acquisition of organic knowledge there also accrues, especially 
among those who are considered the more able, a sense of behavioral analogy” (p. 84). 
People react to dangerous physical conditions that require an immediate response for 
self-preservation. They effectively handle their difficult situations although they cannot 
verbally explain the reason for doing so. This ability is also called the skill of intuitive 
familiarity (Barnard, 1950, p. 133). Barnard organized the concepts of patterns of 
physiological reactions, patterns of muscular behaviour, emotional dispositions, organic 
knowledge of the concrete, and an organic sense of analogy within three categories: 
physical, social and intellectual skills. 
Personal knowledge 
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 Barnard (1940/1995) explained that “by personal knowledge of fact I mean those 
observations and conceptions of which we are aware, about which we are presumably 
able to make statements should it be necessary or desirable to do so” (p. 85). Barnard 
(1950, p. 134) defined personal knowledge as that which individuals acquire and 
accumulate when they deal with specific materials at specific times and in specific 
places. Thus, personal knowledge is local and context bound.  
Personal knowledge can be converted from organic knowledge. In addition, Barnard 
stated the process as follows:  
 
It is through language communication and abstraction that the know-how hidden or 
implicit in skills becomes explicit and overt. Through abstractions and 
communication we extract from skills statements of fact and general propositions 
concerning facts. These become the keystones in the arch of knowledge (1950, p. 
133). 
 
Barnard argued that the importance of personal knowledge is not completely 
recognized as it is organic knowledge and many people are unwilling to admit that it is 
knowledge. However, Barnard (1950) emphasized the importance of personal 
knowledge by saying that “each of us is a little island of this kind of knowledge, an 
island that grows quite quickly with early experience, more slowly later, and finally 
ceases as the losses of memory exceed the gains produced by experience” (p. 134).  
Moreover, Barnard (1950) argued that the importance of personal knowledge is not 
negligible, as follows: 
 
This kind of personal, on-the-spot knowledge, too often underrated, is absolutely 
indispensable for the acceptance and the discharge of responsibility for all and any 
action, and the capacity for responsibility is a vital component in the execution of 
useful work or development of careers in every field (p. 135). 
 
Thus, reliable behaviours in a workplace depend on personal knowledge. Barnard 
(1950) also suggested that personal knowledge is related to morality within an 
organization. In relation to this, “The best intentions and the highest principles will not 
guarantee truly responsible behavior if a man is living in the clouds or is out of touch 
with his environment and with his co-workers” (Barnard, 1950, p. 135). 
Formal knowledge 
Barnard (1940/1995) said that:  
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...our habits of thought lead us to regard facts—intellectually formulated 
statements about things—as something external, objective, and independent of the 
users of them, to be found in the encyclopedia, or recorded in notes. But a 
previously acquired fact as used in a decision is an experience. It is something 
remembered, even if only briefly (p. 85).  
 
Consequently, Barnard (1940/1995) regarded formal knowledge of fact as a form of 
experience. However, formal knowledge differs from organic and personal knowledge 
as it is consciously received through symbolism and intellectual judgment and acquired 
through language. 
As material, facts and concepts are verbalized and manipulated by skills in the 
discrimination and operation of abstractions. People develop their mental attitudes and 
intellectual processes, such as logical thinking and mathematical operations, through 
which they produce and transmit a large number of facts and concepts. Barnard (1950) 
defined formal knowledge as what is verbalized and available to anyone because such 
knowledge is systematically recorded in society. Formal knowledge has swiftly 
expanded and continues to grow at an extremely rapid rate. These voluminous resources 
are social rather than personal possessions. The amount of formal knowledge exceeds 
the individual capacity to accumulate it. Therefore, the method of making our vast 
accumulations of organized knowledge available and communicating it to others 
remains a serious problem.  
Interaction between Skill, Knowledge and Judgment 
Barnard (1940/1995, p. 86) suggested that experience is a process and that if we clarify 
the process of experience, we can understand how we think, how we observe, how we 
feel, how we respond, what connotations we understand and the relationships among 
physical conditions, affective states, will and ideations. In addition, Barnard (1940/1995, 
p. 86) indicated that the forms of experience are intimately interconnected and that the 
experience acquired in one form alters other forms over time. 
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 Figure 1: The Pyramid of Knowledge 
 
Source: Based on Barnard (1950) 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, Barnard suggested using a pyramid metaphor to explain the 
relationship among the forms of experience. At the base, we find physical, social and 
intellectual skills, and above these, the personal knowledge essential to responsible 
behaviour. Formal knowledge is above personal knowledge but intellectual equipment is 
by no means the apex of the pyramid. Judgment occupies the supreme position (Barnard, 
1950, p. 135).  
Moreover, Barnard suggested that skill, personal knowledge, formal knowledge and 
judgment interact in a dynamic fashion (Figure 2). Bodily skills can become personal 
knowledge through language communication and abstraction. Personal knowledge is 
local and context bound, but if its importance and value are recognized, it is socially 
shared as formal knowledge. People make a judgment on the basis of bodily skills, 
personal and formal knowledge, so that the cycle beginning with an action finally 
evolves into yet another action. Thus, skills are fundamentally acquired and 
accumulated through action, change into forms such as personal and formal knowledge 
and return to action through making a judgment (Barnard, 1950). 
 
  
16
 Figure 2: Interaction between Skills, Knowledge and Judgment 
 
Source: Based on Barnard (1950) 
 
Barnard (1950) defined judgment as follows: “Judgment is concerned with decisions 
or solutions of problems when there is not sufficient factual evidence to warrant a 
conclusion or where the facts are subject to more than one interpretation” (p. 136). He 
explained that a decision is required even if we lack sufficient and valid evidence to 
make one. There are two types of judgment: determining the means to an established 
end and setting the ends themselves. The latter can be termed moral judgment. Barnard 
(1950) argued that judgment is difficult, stating that:  
 
The greatest need for judgment relates to the formulating of aims and goals 
because they involve determination of purpose and establishment of value. And 
here it is precisely that our skills and our knowledge are hardest to put to use. Cold 
reason cannot predominate here… (p. 137). 
 
Such judgment is inseparable from the concept of responsibility because people must 
make a judgment with insufficient evidence and be responsible for the results. People 
learn by repeatedly experiencing such tough judgments, radically change themselves, 
and develop their personality. Barnard (1937, p. 105) argues that personality is a 
differential capability for social adaption and is enhanced or decreased by the social 
environment’s reaction. Difficult moral judgments always test people’s personalities.  
Thus, there is a deep interaction between practical thinking and knowledge and 
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 people’s actions. Practitioners enhance their abilities through experience. However, 
experience differs from repetition of action, which is better termed practice to acquire 
patterns of action (Barnard, 1940). Those who are responsible for the results of their 
actions learn from experience. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this section, I summarize the major points of the discussion and their implications. 
First, I confirm that one category of researchers highlights Barnard’s contributions to 
knowledge management. Some of these are also major contributors to developing 
knowledge management. The scope ranges across experiential learning, intuition, 
judgmental decision making and organizational knowledge. Novicevic et al. (2002) and 
Gehani (2002) clearly insist that Barnard is a pioneer of knowledge management. 
I also verify the assumption that one reason Barnard’s contributions are not 
sufficiently recognized is because of limited access to his related works. In fact, those 
who highly praise Barnard’s contributions, such as Wolf (1994), Novicevic et al. (2002), 
Gehani (2002) and Isomura (2010), have accessed works by Barnard with which other 
researchers are not familiar. Therefore, they improve our understanding of Barnard’s 
theory of practical thinking and knowledge. The references provided here would serve 
to develop insights into Barnard’s considerations of practical thinking and knowledge. 
In addition, the researchers who have re-evaluated Barnard’s contributions point to 
directions for utilizing his contributions in developing knowledge management 
practices: first, developing more effective learning methods for practitioners; second, 
building decision-making procedures in an organization by making effective use of 
intuitive, judgmental decision making; third, clarifying and utilizing the intangible 
management resources accumulated in an organization. In this line, Badaracco (1991) 
develops a means of using embedded knowledge in strategic alliance and Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) propose a framework to use implicit and explicit knowledge for 
developing new products and services. 
Second, Barnard ardently engaged in developing his theory of practical thinking and 
knowledge from the 1930s to the 1950s. Barnard (1936) emphasized the importance of 
non-logical mental processes in complex, ever-changing situations. Non-logical mental 
processes are deeply related to practitioners’ decision making and methods of thinking 
called strategic thinking. Strategic thinking focuses on factors employed to change the 
situation practitioners are facing; therefore, strategic thinking integrates with action and 
decision making. Barnard demonstrated that the processes are exploratory and based on 
a trial-and-error method and also suggested that the processes are subjectively rational 
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 and can be objectively rational if it is possible to acquire some data supported by 
experience and a continuous trial-and-error procedure.  
Third, Barnard argued that experience plays a major role in developing non-logical 
mental processes; Barnard especially emphasized the importance of a habit of action 
under conditions of responsibility. Practitioners learn by repeatedly experiencing tough 
judgments, radically changing themselves and developing their personalities.  
Moreover, Barnard clarified how practitioners essentially transform their experience 
into different types of knowledge: skills, personal knowledge and formal knowledge.  
From the viewpoint of executive functions, Barnard (1937, 1938, 1945a, 1945b, 1947a, 
1947b) argued that action, thinking, decision making and knowledge are integrated and 
systematically explained how to acquire behavioural knowledge through experience, 
exchange personal and formal knowledge in an organization, and utilize skills and 
knowledge when making judgments.  
Thus, Barnard explained how practitioners develop their own methods of thinking 
and acquire knowledge by learning from experience. I especially emphasize that his 
insights on personal knowledge are important in that personal knowledge is the basis of 
responsibility. 
Overall, I conclude from these implications that Barnard systematically built his 
theory of practical thinking and knowledge. Barnard contributed to expanding the scope 
of knowledge management by arguing that practitioners integrate action, knowledge and 
thinking. More concretely, his main contributions are to clarify the process through 
which practitioners integrate action, personal knowledge and formal knowledge by 
making judgments and developing their own methods of thinking on the basis of their 
experience. Practitioners learn by repeatedly experiencing tough judgments and 
accumulate personal knowledge as the basis of their responsibility. Practitioners’ 
methods of thinking are valuable in complex, ever-changing situations and differ from 
logical thinking in that the methods secure rationality on the basis of their experience 
and trial-and-error procedure. 
Finally, I suggest future research. Barnard essentially built his theory of practical 
thinking and knowledge based on his experience. I assume that practitioners’ methods 
of theory building are different from those of researchers. Barnard was a practitioner as 
well as scholar and he developed his own theories using his abilities as a 
participant-observer (Wolf, 1974, 1994). In fact, O’Connor (2012, 2013) argues that 
Barnard developed a new organic applied social science on the basis of his experience. I 
would like to examine Barnard’s method as a case and clarify how Barnard built his 
theory from experience. 
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 チェスター・バーナードの知識管理への貢献を再考する�実践的思考と知識を��に 
 
��� �人 
 
�� �� 
本稿は、チェスター・バーナードの知識管理への貢献を再考する。マイケル・ポランニ
ーによる暗黙的知識や個人的知識の概念が知識管理の発展に関わる研究者のヒントになっ
ている。こうした研究者は、思考と行動を統合するスキルや明示的知識のような行動的知
識を活用している。これに対して、バーナードは、知識だけでなく思考が行動において統
合されていることを論じている。それゆえ、バーナードは、知識管理のスコープを拡大す
ることに貢献している。しかしながら、いくつかの例外を除くと、バーナードの貢献は、
ポランニーと比較すると、過少評価されている。その理由としては、バーナードの主著『経
営者の役割』を除くと、彼のその他の文献へのアクセスが限定されていることにあると想
定できる。したがって、本稿では、まず、経験学習、直観的意思決定、組織知識に関して
バーナードの見解について論じた文献をレビューする。続いて、バーナードが実践的思考
と知識についてどのように彼の理論を発展させてきたかを体系的に検討する。最後に、バ
ーナードの知識管理への貢献を再評価する。
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